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In recent work on the inflationary bias in macrceconomic polícy (f3ackus
and Dr1fCi11 1985), the choice of policy has been modelled as a gftme
between the private sector of the economy and the government, in which the
private sector has incomplete informetion about the government's
preferences. The private sector dces not know whether the government is
committed to e non-inflationary policy or whether it ís maxímising an
objective function whlch puts negative weight on lnflation and posítíve
weight on expandíng output above the naturel level. The mecroeconomic
model which is used is a statíc end deterministic one which embodies the
'príce-surprise' model of output ín its simplest Corm: ín each period the
excess oC output above the natural rate is proportionel to Che infletion
surprise. The only source of uncertainty in the model acises from tlie
randomisíng strategies which the government may choose. 71te government is
essumed to choose the actusl rate of inflation in eech period, and the
private sector 'chooses' the expected rate of inflatíon.
The enalysis of this es e finitely repeated gane, drawing heavíly on
the work of Kreps and Wílson (1982), produces e sequentíal equilihrium ín
which the non-committed government imitates the committed government until
the end of the game draws close. In each period of the game, the
government has e 'reputation': the probebility with which the privnte
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sector agents believe that the government is committed to zeco inflation;
nnd tliis belíef ís updeted each period by Bayes' rule eccordíng to the
ovc~nt observed (inflation~no infletion) and the strategies which each
possible type of government would edopt at thnt stage of the gnme. Since a
committed government is known never to inflate, and since the private
sector perfectly monitors the government's actions, the observation of
infletion immedietely reduces the government's reputation to zero. The
cost essociated with losing one's reputation in this way is sufficíently
grent to deter the non-commi[[ed government fcom cnusing infletion, untíl
the end of the game approaches. Aa the game drews near its end, the
government mey become indifferent between inflating and not inflatíng, in
which case it may pursue a rendomising strategy, mixíng the strategies
(inflnte~do not inflate). Conditional on the realisation of no ínflation
wtren randomising, its reputation in the next period wíll be higher. In the
papers by Backus and Driffill (1985a) and Barro (1986) the increese in
reputation which occurs is just sufficient to offset the effects of the
increased tendency of the non-committed government to inflate as time gces
by, so that overall the expected inflation rete (or its mean value)
remains constent during the period of time when the government is
randomising.
Tlie mein result from this enalyais is thet the uncertainty in the
minds of the private sector is sufficient to induce [he uncommitted
government to edhere to the policy of the committed government for most of
the game. No formel constitutional emendment or restriction on government
freedom of action is needed in order to achieve the socielly efficient
outcome, except near the end of the game.
The results of those papers may be sensitive to some oC the
restrictive assumptíons made about the beliefe and informetion of privete
sector egents and the mtrategiea which are open to the government. For
example, Vickers (1986) modífies the atructure of the game slightly by
introducing two different types of government thet eech give some weight
to employment in their objective function, but díffer in the amount. This
contrasts with the assumption of an uncomaitted end a committed government
used by Berro (1986) and by Backus and Driffill (1985a). Comparison of
this analysis with Backua end Driffill shows thet the assumed 'committed'
player simplifles the problem and mekea it eeaier to get e pooling
equilíbríum rather than a separeting equilibrium. The player who is
committed to zero infletion alweys wants to play zero under any
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circumstances whatever, and consequently any other action immediately
ídentifíes its perpetretor es being uncommítted. The uncommitted plnyer
then has effectívely [wo choices of action in eech period of time: (i)
zero inflation and (11) his best response to the public's expectation. Thr.
scope for pooling exísts, because the commítted player has no interest in
the ection an uncommitted pleyer would take and does not attempt to tnkc
an action which would dlstinguish him from an uncommitted plnyer. Ry
contrast, ín Vickers' formulatlon, the player who ceres less nbout
unemployment has an incentive to teke actions which seperate him from the
other type of player. Vickera shows that pooling equilibria can in e wide
clasa of aituations be ruled out. In n two-period game, the two types of
pleyers take different actions in the first period so that the type is
completely revealed in the aecond períod. In the first period, the less
concerned (about unemployment) player chooses en inflatíon rate which is
so low that a more concerned pleyer would not wish to imitate his
behaviour. This result contrasts sharply with the pooling equilibrium of
the Backua end Driffill formuletion. It suggests that one should
investigate the way alternative nsaumptions ebout private agents' priors
affect the aolutiona of the gamea.
In Section 1 below the analysis of Vickers is extended to include
cases where pooling equilibria are posaible. In addition, in Section 2, a
situation in which private agents believe that governments mey come in
more than two typea is considered. In this case, seperatíng and pooling
equilibria are possible, depending on how similar the possible government
types are.
One atark result of the game in which private agents can monitor
perfectly the ectíona of the government, and where there is no uncertainty
in the execution of policy actions is that, if the inflation rate ever
deviates from zero, the government's reputatíon immedietely end
irrevocably fells to zero. Thís result is too strong for the real world,
where governments have only lndirect control over the rate of inflation,
meny rendom events intervene its determínstion, and the private sector mny
not be able to monitor the government's actions índependently of the fínnl
outcome. Thus it would be interesting to exemine a model whích embodi~s
these factors.
In Sectíon j of the paper this is attempted. It is assumed thnt the
government is eíther commltted to zero ínflation or uncommitted, ~s
before. A government is assumed to take one of Cwo actíons with respFCt to
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lnflntion -intend zero inflation, or intend inflation- end the ectuel
ouLcome is not certain to be the one intended. There ís a chance that the
opposite of the intended outcome may occur. The prívate sector can observe
only the final outcome, the actual inflation rate, and cannot tell whether
or not it was intended.
In this situation, application of Bayes' rule to the evolution of
reputntion shows that the observetion of inflation dces not immediately
reduce reputation to zero, since it can always occur even if the
govcrnment is committed. In a two-period game it now results that the
uncommitted government will elways play eíther a pure strategy (intend
inflation) or a mixed strategy in the first period, such that it is
indifferent between infleting end not inflating. Its reputation improves
if no inflation occurs end deterioratea if some inflation occurs.
It appears that a government with a moderately good reputation is
likely to put more probability on intending zero inflation than is a
government wlth either e very good or e very poor reputation, since near
the extremes it is not possible for the government to influence its
reputetion much and so the coat of inflating is lower than for middling
reputations. It further appeara that even if the probability of error is
small, so that actual inflation ia very likely to equal intended
inflation, [hen the committed government will not pursue the pure stretegy
of intending zero inflation, but will alweys mix to some extent. This
shows that the abilíty to get close to the efficient outcome depends on
the information end belief atructure to e considerable degree.
The analysis of this model ia cerried out for a two-period game. Even
for the very simple structure proposed here, the enalysis becomes so
complicated as to prevent general results for e T-period game (T greater
than 2) Crom being derived.
The model discussed in Section 3 is related to work by Canzoneri
(1985) end by StSderstrtim (1985) in that it includes, as they have done,
imperfect monitoring of government ections. StSderstrtSm enalyses a geme
between a government end a centraliaed labour union in which the
government eonitors the union'e ection with error, but is fully informed
about the union's objectivea. As here, only two outcomes are posaible for
each pleyer. The union seta vagea, end cen either be aggressive or
passive. The government sets monetary policy, which can be either
accommodetory or non-eccommodatory. Stlderstrtlm examines an infinitely
repcated gnme and uses a sólution proposed by Rubinstein (1979), which
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induces the union to pley e passive wage strategy in each period of time.
The government 'punishes' the union by not accommodating wage increnses if
they have occurred frequently enough in the past. The critical frequency
of occurrence is a dieinishing function of the duration of the game, nnd
approaches the frequency of naturelly occurring (exogenous) wage shocks as
the game proceeds. This result auggests imperfect monitoring alone is not
enough to cause inefticient government beheviour.
Cenzonerí (1985) anelyses n aomewhat different model where the
government has private and incommunicable information about money demand.
In his model the money stock (government's contml variable) cnn vary
continuously rather than taking on just two discrete values. The privete
sectoc responds by anticipating inflation for e'reversionary period' if
it exceeds some critical value in a period. This happens randomly, and
thus induces occasíonal apparent breakdowns of cooperation between the
privete sectoc and the governsent. Meanwhile, the government ís
discouraged from ceusing inflation in each period, a result which
parellels thet of StSderstrbm.
Section 4 of the paper contains some conclusions.
1. Díffering Tastes: Two Typea, Many Stretegies
In this part of the paper the atructure used by Vickers (1986) is adopted.
Consider a two-period game pleyed between the private sector and the
government. In each period the government chooses an infletíon rete xT-1'
x,f; and the privete sector foros expectetions of that period's inflntion
rete xT-1, x.el,. There are two potentiel governments which differ in the
weight Chey put on output in their objective functions. The per period
payoff for government of type 1 is
uí ~ -xc~2 ~ ci(xt-xt),
where t- T-1, T and 0( cl ( c2. Thus Lhe game runs for periods T-1 nnd
T. Both types of government care somewhat about output, but type 2 cnres
more than type 1. This is basically the same set-up as Dnckus and Driffíll
(1985e) and Berro (1986), except the taste difference replnces the
committed~uncommltted distlnction, end we nllow any ectlon on the renl
line, rather then a choíce from just two. As in those models, [he privnte
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sector is assumed to attach en initiel probability to the event that the
governmcnt is of type 1, p,l,-1, et the stert of period T-1, which it
updutes as the game proceeds. The government knows its own type. We look
for a sequential equilibrium of the game.
In the final period, T, the government takes xT es being fixed and
clenrly sets x,f - cí.
Ttius the payoff in the final period for a government of type i is
uiíT.xT) - ci~2 - cix.Í..
Tlius the total peyoff for government of type i over both periods of the
gnme, given that in T-1 the privete sector expects inflation xT-1 is
~i ~ -~-1~2 ~ ci(xr-l-xr-1) ~ cilz - cixT. (l.z)
Thc real action in thís geme comes in the first períod (T-1) when the
government ctiooses an inflation rate x,l,-1 taking ~-1 as given, but teking
into account the wey ín which the private sector forms its expectetions in
period T as a function of the inflation rete observed in T-1.
Ui will be used to denote the utility of government of type i which
takes action xT-1 in period T-1, and ci in T, when the private sector
forms expectations xT of inflation in T(xT-1 ia taken as some fixed
number). Effectively we are considering utility effecta of action taken
after xT-1 hes been chosen. Thus only changes in xT-1 end xT affect the
velue of Ui(xT-1,xT). Note that the value of xT-1 does not affect the
ranking over (x.f-1,xT) combinations for any player.
The private sector will form expectations which are retional, snd
since there ere two discrete government types, they can use a step
function, such that xT - xl if xT-1 s x' and xT - xz if x,f-1 ) x', for
some velues of xl, xZ end x'.
Two possibilities are (i) a aeparating equílibrium end (ii) a poolíng
equilibrium. In the separeting equilibrium, following Vickers, we have
expectations formed by
c 1 1 f x,f-1 s k8e~ - (1.3a)c2 if xT-1 ~ kH
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where kB is defined by
u2lke.cl) - u2(c2.c2) (1.3)
and that the type-2 government ia indifferent between infleting nt rate c2
and beíng identified as type 2 on the one hand, and choosing low inflation
kB end being identified as of type 1. Me asause thet the type-2 government
then chooses ínflatíon rate c2 in thís case. At the same time, the type-1
government must find it in its interest to choose the lower rnte of
inflation k8 in T-1, and thua be identified as of type 1. The condition
U1(kB,cl) ) U1(cl.c2) (1.4)
must therefore be satisfied.
A seperating equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 1, which follows
Víckers (1986). The Sndifference curves of e government of type i in
e
(x,l,-l,x.l,) space are parabolae which peak at x,l,-1 ~ c1. The slope of the
indifference curves of US defined by (1.2) nbove is
d eMT
dxl'-1
~ 1 - xi'-l~ci.
U1 conat
(1.5)
so they all have a alope equel to unity at ic.l,-1 ~ 0. In the figure, UZ is
the indifference curve of the type-2 player through (c2,c2). It cuts the
vertical axía at (O,c2~2). Thus for cl ) c2~2 we have a sepnrating
equilibrium in the positive quadrant. IcB is defined as above by (1.3). For
cl ) c2~2, ( 1.4) is automatically satisfied.
Now consider a poolíng equilibrium. In this cese expectations are
formed as follows




where c ~ pcl ~ (1-p)c2










A pooling equilibrium is illustrated in Figure 2 below. It is illustrated
for cl ) c2~2. .C lies below cl, such that both players prefer (,L,c) to any
other outcome.
A pooling equilibrium dcea not elvays exist since there dces not
always exist an ~ which satisfies (1.7) and (1.8) above, for .L s cl. As is
clenr from Figure 2, if c is sufficiently close to cz because p is
sufficiently small, then no ~i s cl may exist such that the type-2
government prefers (~C,e) to (c2,c2).






Figure 2: Pooling equilibrium
C2
XT- ~
Vickers rejecta pooling equílibria because it is always possible for
the type-1 government to defect by chooaing e low rate of infletion m such
that, if the government could play ~ and thereby convince Che public thnt
it was of type 1, and have the public ezpect xT ~ cl, only a type-1 player
would find it advantageous to do so. Thus m lies just to the left of the
type-2 indifference curve through (.L,c). Thus we have
Uz(,(.~) ~ U2(m,cl), (1.9)
but
U1(,C,c) ( U1(m.cl). (1.10)
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S1nce in the posítíve orthant the indífference curves of the type-1
Kuvcrnment have smaller slopes then those of the type-2 government, such
rui m nlways exísts, nnd the pooling equilibrium can alweys be rejected.
Thus for cz 2 cl 2 cz~2 e separating equilibrium exists as defined
c~bove in (1.3) and ( 1.4), and no pooling equilibria exist.
For cl ( cz~2, however, things look different because we cen in fact
find pooltng equilibria which do not fall victim to Vickers' defection
nrgument (above) for rejectlon, and in some circumstances these eppear to
dominate the separeting equilibrium.
Consider the following equilibrie. For cl ( c2~2 and c~ c2~2 a
pooling equilibrium vith mixing exists. The type-2 government plays
Kf-1 - 0 with probability q and x,f-1 - c2 with probability (1-q). The
type-1 government plays x.~.-1 ~ 0 certainly. Contingent on x,l,-1 z O having
been observed the probebility of the government being of type 1 is
P ' P ' (1-P)q
and the expected inflation rete in T is therefore pcl . ( 1-p)cz, q is
chosen so that this expected inflation rate is c~~2, i.e. so thet
Pcl . (1-P)cz - cZ~2.
The private sector forms expectations
~ - if ) 0
cZ~2 if xT-1 s 0
e
Given these expectations, the type-1 govern~ent prefers the outcome
(O,c2~2) and the type-2 government ia índitferent between (O,c2~2) and
(c2,c2) end chooses a random strategy as descríbed above.
This pooling equilibrium ia proof against the defection argument sínce
the índifference curve of the type-1 player through (O,c2~2) is below that
of the type-2 player vhich pasaea through the seme point, except at
xT 1- 0 where they coincide, as Figure j illustretes.
c2 xi'-1 '
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cl
Fígure 3: Pooling equilibrium with oíxing when cl C c2~2 and c~ c2~2
c2
For the case where cl s c C cz~2 an equílíbrium exists similer to the
last one but in pure atrategíes. Expectations are formed by
e
Kf -
e íf ~,-1 s ,C
i r ~ ~c
(1.12)
For the type-1 governments
U1(~.c) 2 U1(cl.c2)





w'~.,rc 0 s .C s cl. In order to prevent defection by type-1 governments, e
Lhird condition must be satisfied. 77iere must be no value of x,f-1 which
for xT - cl is preferred to Lhe pooling outcome (.l,c) by type 1 but not by






These two equations place an upper limít on the value of .C. Note that j is
necessarily negative, as Figure 4 illustrates, because the indifference
curves of type 1 are Clatter than those of type 2 to the right of the
vertical axis, and steeper to the left of the vertical axis.
J 0 l cl
F'iti~n-e 4: Poolíng equilibrium in pure stcategies with c1C c2~2 and
c ~ c2~2
Macroeconomic Policy Games with Incomplete Inlormation 301
From (1.15) and (1.16) it cen be deduced that
,t s (e-cl)l2
or
.C s (1-P)(c2-cl)~2. (1.17)
In addition, we have the condition that .~ s cl.
The higher is the value of ~, within the constraints of (1.17) nnd
1 s cl, the greater the payoff to each type of government, tnking the
value of xT-I as given. But if initial expectations arc [aken into
account, end noting that x,r-1 - x.el,-1 ~ ,i for both types of government in
this equilibrium, it is clear that both types of players ere best off when
.C - 0. On grounds of equilibrium dominance, this would therefore be thc
chosen equilibrium from among these pooling equilibria.
In the Appendix it is shown that in the case where cl s cz~2 and
c s c2~2, the pooling equilibrium ebove dominates the seperatíng
equilibrium, where the separating equílibrium exists. All players in the
game -governments of both types, and agents in the private sector- prefer
the outcome under [he pooling equilibrium. In the case where cl ) c2~2 but
c~ c2~2, the pooling equilibrius dces not dominate the separatíng
equílibrium, nor ís it dominated by the separating equilíbrium. Doth types
of government prefer the pooling equilibrium, but the prívate sector mny
for some parameter combinations prefer the separating outcome. Nnte thnt
the separating equilibrium only exists for cl Z c2~9 in any event.
Consequently, seperating equilibrie can be ruled out for the first
case (cl s c s c2~2) but no[ for ihe second.
In summery, the equílibría for a game with two government types cnn be
reduced to the followíng:





if ) kc2 xl'-1 D
and type-1 governmen[s pley x,f-1 - kD
type-2 governments pley xT-1 - cz.
302 J. Drillill
(it) For cl ( c2IZ but c 2 cZI2, a partlal pooling equílibrius exists vith
c2I2 if x7,-1 5 0
cZ if xT-1
type-1 plnys x,t-1 ~ 0
typc-Z plnys xT-1 - 0 with probability q end
x.C-1 - cZ with probability (1-q)
sucti that czl2 - clp ' ( 1-p)cZ
where P ` PI(P' U -P)9).
For some combinations of parameters ( cl,c2 end p) a separating
equilibrium may also exíst.
(iii) For cl t c( cZI2, a pooling equilibrius exists with expectations
ex-r '
c if x.f-1 S 0
if ) 0cZ x.f-1
.
Both type 1 and type 2 plsy tt,I,-1 ~ 0.
'1'he poolíng equilibriui proposed for cl C cZI2 holds good as cl -i p.
By contrast the separating equilibrius ia only available for cl x cZ~9,
since at that point the constraint (1.4) begina to bind, as Vickera pointa
out. Note that as cl -~ 0, the pooling equilibriu~ proposed is continuous
with the equilibrium in Backus end Driffill ( 1985s) end Barro ( 1986). In
the limit as cl ~ 0 in the above pooling equilibrium, type 2 plsys
xT-1 - 0 íf p x} so that c S cZ~2. If p~} then type 2 plays x,f-1 - 0
with probability q such thet the ez-post probabílity of type 1, contingent
on ~-1 - 0, is p - }.
2. Many Types
This part of the peper considers how the geae is effected vhen private
agents believe at the start of the geme that the government's preference
for employment (reflected in the parameter ci) is drawn from a
distribution which has some bounded support. As before, a two-period game
is considered.
~ 0
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Suppose at T-1 the policy-mnker could be of any type ci ín some rnnge,
[c,c]. Can a seperatíng equílibríum be found? As before, ít is assumed
thet the private aector egents form expectatíons xT based on their
observations of actual inflation at tiee T-1, x.f-1. Let the expectation hc
represented Dy the tunctíon
xT - f(x.l,-1). (2.1)
If the equilibrius is separating, then for each type cí there ís an
optimal choice of x,r-1 given f(.) whích is different for each ci. Thus in
equilibrium it must be true that
f(x1'-1(c)) ~ c (2.2)
for sll c E[c,c], since x,f-1(c) reveals the agent's true type c.
If the function f(~,-1) is such that x.r-1 minimíses cost, then it
satisfies an additional condition. Cost for pleyer of type 1 is, as in
(1.2) above
ui - -x21'-1~2
. c(x.l'-1-x1'-1) ' c2~2 - cf(x.i'-1). (2-3)
Providing f(.) is differentiable and continuous, at an optimum the first
order conditíon is satisfied:
~Ui~~x,l'-1 - -x7'-1 ' c - cr' (xz.-1) - o (2.`')
and
~2~i~~xT-1 - -1 - cf" ( x.l,-1) ( 0. (2-5)
So f(x,f-1) is a function which for all c E[c,c] satisfies (2.2) and (2.4)
and (2.5). Combining ( 2.2) and ( 2.4) gives a differentiel equatíon ín f:
df x - 1 - x
dx f(x)~ (2.6)
Thus f(x) ís a functíon which has a slope of .1 when x- 0 (f(O) ) 0),
dímínishing to 0 at x- f(x). To tie down the constant of lntr`Rrntlon, we
cnn set f(x) - c when x- f(x). Thís means that the egent with thc hlghrst
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value of c(c) playes x.~,-1 - c: it is not in his interests Co reduce xT-1
to nttcmpt l.o signnl a lower c.
Hrrving used the upper bound on c to position f(.), the lower bound on
c is deLermined by the intersection of f(x) wiLh the x-axis. AC Chis point
Lhc plnycr e sets x~, 1(c) - 0. This is illustrnted in Figure 5.
xT
Figure 5: The equilibrium expectetions function xT - f(x.f-1) with e
continuum of government types c E(c,c]
Tlie value oC c must lie between c and c. If c- c, then the player
with tt~e lowest value of c sets x,r-1 ~ 0. This restricts the possible
values of c to a narrow range, since z) c~2. (This is beceuse the c
player has en indifference curve passíng through (c,c) on the diagram
which also passes through (O,c~2), and f(x,C-1) lies above this
indifference curve except at (c,c) where they coincide.)
It is not possible to use the part of the function f(.) lying in the
Nw quudrant where x S 0 end f(x) 2 0 to induce players with a c( c to
choose e point on thet pert of the curve, beceuse the second order
condition (2.5) ís not" setisfied on f(x) for x C 0. Points of tengency
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here are maxima of the cost function, not minima. The second order
condition (2.5) is satísfied for c E[c,c] where x,f-1(c) E[O,c].
The above procedure defines e value c as a functíon of c. If thrr~,
were plsyers of type c( c then the above sepereting equílihrium would not.
survive. Governments of type C C C would choose x,l,-1 - 0 and the privntc
sector belief c- f(0) as defined above would not be rntionnl. In this
cnse it mey be possible to find a pert pooling~part scpnrAtin~G
equilibrium.
An equílibríum for this case is postulated as follows. F.xpectations
are formed by the discontinuous function
where
c if xT-1 s 0
f( ) if
(2.7)
x1'-1 x1'-1 E (~cl'-1'c]
c c






In this equilibrium, the private sector expects infletion at a rate c if
it observes xT-1 ~ 0, and expects inflation given by the f(.) function
derived above for higher inflation in T-1. Governments with c ) c pref~r
to choose an (x,f-1,xT) combínation on (x,f-l,f(xt-1)) in the range
x,i,-1 E(i~,-l,c] rather than to choose (O,c), and conversely for
governments wíth c 5 c.
At the Doundary between the two regions is the government of type c
that is indifferent between (O,c) and ( x.l,-l,f(x,i,-1)). Thus, c, xT 1 nnd c
sntisfy the condition thet
Uc(0'c) s U'c(x.I'-1'fl~-1)) (2.to)
where U~(.) ís the utílity of agent of type c es defined by r~riuntion
(1.2).
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In Figure 6, c is plotted on the vertical axis, and against i[ on the
horizontel axis is plotted (i) c, the highest velue of c such that e
government of type c prefers or is indifferent to the combinatíon (O,c) to
any puint on the expectations curve ( x,f-l,f(x,f-1)), and (ii) the oean






1 cp(c)ac ~ ! p(c)ac~ ~- -, n -
where c(c) - max c such
that ( oc) preferred to Rx)
Figure 6: Hybrid pooling~separating equilibrium with a continuum of
government types
AL c- c, all government types with c s c prefer the combination (O,c)
tu a point on the curve, and the mean value of c for these types will be
Iess thaii c. As c is reduced, Che value of c' rises, until c- c~2 when ell
types prefer (O,c).
T'hus there will always be a unique velue of c which sa[isfies (2.8).
At the equilibrium, ell pleyers c s c prefer x.T-1 - 0, x,el, - c. The
uvernge value of c for these players is c, and consequenCly private sector
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expFCtatíons are ratíonal. For players c) c, a pnir e(~Ci'-1'xT - f(xT-1))
is prnfcrr~d and thry choosc a vnlue of xT-1 which idr`nt.ifirs thr'ir tru~
type.
C
If f cp(c)dc s c~2, then the average type ovor all plnyrrs ls lr`~~
c
thnn c~2, and ell players choose to play xT 1- 0, xT - c whcrr
c
c- f cp(c)dc. In this case there is complete poolíng.
c
In Vickers (1986), pooling equilibria are dominated, becm~se somr
players would have an incentive to defect, pley some other xT-1, to
persuade the publlc that they are of a perticular type. Nowever, this docs
not appeer to be the cese in this instance.
The difference between the result here and Vickers' result is thnt
here the pooling equilibrium occurs with x.f-1 : 0, and in order to achievr.
separation, a pleyer with a low velue of c would have to pley e negative
inflation rate in T-1, which would give e worse outcome than the pooling
equilibrium. However, in Vickers the pooling occurs with a positive
infletion rate in T-1, end the low-c player can achieve separation by
playing a lover but still posítive inflation rate. In that cnse, the
separeting devietion pays off better than the pooling equilibrium.
The analyais of thie aection auggests thet the reputational discipline
on non-cosmitted governmenta works when private sector belíefs are eore
general than ín Backus end Driffill ( 1985). The crucial element is a
sufficiently wíde disparity in the range of government preferences.
3. F~cogenous Uncerteinty
This part of the paper examinea whet happens when the simple model of
Backus end Driffill ( 1985e) is pecturbed by Lhe addition of an exogenous
rendom element. The following atructure is assumed.
Covernments ere of two types. Type 1('dry') are committed to zero




whcre xt is the rate of inflation in period t. Type 2('wet') care ebout
inflation and unemployment and heve the following prefecences in each
period:
u2C - -xt~2 . c(xt-x~),
where xt is the private sector's expectation of infletion in period t.
It is assumed as before that only two outcomes for the actuel
inflation rate sce ever observed, either xt - 0 or xt - c. However, it is
here assumed thet governments do not have perfect control over the actual
inrlation rate. With some small probability (1-n) the government hits the
wrong button, so Chat, if it íntends to create infla[ion equal to c, then
c occurs with probability n and zero occurs with probability (1-n), and
conversely iC zero inflation is intended. n~}, so that what is intended
is more likely to occur than not. The structure adopted here follows
closely that of StSderstrtlm (1985) in having two potentiel outcomes for
government behaviour in each period. However, in StSderstrtlm, the
government's objectives ere known for aure. (In his set-up the player who
is squi'-.slent to Chs gover:.:ent here is his trsde uaior..) Anether
difference between the present aet-up end StiderstrtSm is that the private
sector is assumed to be able to 'chooae' any polnt on the real line when
ttiey form expectations, which Chey do rationally. As before, the game runs
until a last period when t~ T. The government attempta to maximise the
expected value of the sum of the payoffs received up to the end of the
game. Thus at time s the government maximises
T
~ "it.t-s
Ttie private sector enters period t with the belief that wlth
probabilíty pt the government is of type 1 and with probability ( 1-p ) ofttype 2. Its beliefs are updated using Bayes' rule. Thus if [he type-2
player i s known to play the strategy of intending zeco inflation with
probability qt and intending inflation equal to c with probability ( 1-qt),
then the private sector updates its beliefs such that.
npt
pt.l(xt-0) - nP ' (1`P ) q ,
(3.1a)
t t t
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if xt - c is observed.
The prohnbility of observing infletion equal to c at time t is
(1-n)pt . ( 1-pt)(1-qt) and consequentiy the expected ínflatinn is
xt - cLptll-n) . (1-Pt)(1-qt)). (3.2)
Thus the set-up here is exactly Lhe eame as ín Backus end Driffil]
(1985e), except that actions are not elways carríed out as intended due tn
thís element of exogenous uncertainty. This change in the model hns
signíficant effects. Providíng n is stríctly less thnn one, there is
elways e positive chance of observing the high inflation outcome, even if
the government is actually of type 1(dry). Consequently, thís observation
no longer identifíes the government as being unmístakably wet and reduces
its reputation to zero. Reputation is reduced by a high ínflation outcnme,
but not destroyed. Fro~ equation (3.1b) above, it is seen that íf qt ( 1
so that qt C n, end if n( 1, then condítional on xt - c' pt~l ~ pt' p~~t
if pt ) 0, then pt~l ) 0.
If the realisation is xt ~ 0, which is alweys possíble regardless of
the type of government or strategy played, reputetion is not worsened, and
ímproves if the type-2 pleyer is known to play the zero intended ínflation
strategy with probability less than one (qt C 1).
The greater the amount of noise in the system (i.e. the lower thc
value of n) the less dces the revised reputation differ from the old one,
given any initiel repvtation and strategy choice qt. In the limit ns
nt -~ }, the pleyers have no control Over the outcome and no ohsPrvation
can change reputetion. Of course, there is then no effectíve differencc
between the two types of government. Neither has any control at all.
The solution of the game is now considered. In the final períod, T,
the type-2 player slways íntends inflation c, and the type-1 plnyer
íntends zero ínflatíon. The privete sector's expectation ís
xT z c(PT(1-rt).(1-pT)n).
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Tt~e peyoff to the wet (type-2) player is
e
- c x,f
with probnbility 1-n, and
-cz ~ c(c-xf)
with pcobability ( n). Hence his expected final period payoff is
VT(PT) - -c2(PT(1-n).(1-PT)n) . nc2~2
~ c2pT(2n-1) - nc2~2.
Now considec period T-1.
If the wet plays 'intend inflation' equal to zero with probabílity
q,f-1, his payoff in T-1 is
WT-. - ~;-1(u~(o.x;.-1) ~ V(PTIx;-1 - o))
~ (1-9.1.-1)(uz(c,xI'-1) . V(PTIxq.-1 ` c)}. (3.3)
where uZ(O,xT-1) z-cxT-1 and u2(c,xT-1) . c2~2 - cxT-1. p,f ís determined
by equations ( 3.1a) and ( 3.1b) above. The government chooses qt-1 in the
range n 2 q't-1 2 1-n to maximise WT-1, taking the private sector's
expectations of future inflation as beíng fixed, since in a sequential
equilibrium the strategies ( q,f-1,xT) form e Nash equilíbrium pair. Thus
the equilibrium values of qT-1 satisfy
(1) 9.I'-1 ' rt if u2(O.xT-1) ~ V(PTI~-1 ~ 0)
) u2lc.~-1) ~ V(P1.I~-1 ' c).
(ii) n 2'q,~,-1 2 1 - rt if
u2(O,~tI'-1) ' V(PT~~-1 i
0) ' u2(c.xl'-1) . V(PTI~-1
L c)
for some q,l,-1 E [n,l-n],
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(iíi) q.f-1 - 1- n íf vz(~~~-1) ~ V(PT~~-1 -
( uZ(c.~-1) ' V(p.fl~-1 s c)-
0)
(3.4)
The equilibrium value of 'q,f-1 depends on both n and pT-1. it, is cl~nr
that there ís never nn equilibrium with q'T-1 - n, í.e. with the 'wet'
government pleying exactly the same atrategy as the 'dry' governmrnf. and
intendíng ze.ro inflation wíth probability one. In thís case p.~, would ne
equal to p.l.-1 regardless of the realisation of xT-1, and the expcr,tr~i
peyoff from intending zero inflatíon would be clearly less thnn from
intending inflation equel to c. This result is clearly at variance wit.h
the results of Backus and Driffill (1985a) where with a suffici~ntly gnod
reputation in T-1, the wet player would mimic the dry. The reason for the
difference is that the occurrence of high inflation does not now tota]]y
ruin the government's reputation. It is no longer the case that pT - 0 if
x.I,-1 ` c .
Ne now turn to the solution to the wet government's problem et date
T-1. From (j.le) and (j.lb), p,1,(x,l,-1 ~ 0) is n decreasíng function of qT-1
end p,l,(x.i,-1 z c) is nn increasing function. V(T,pT) is a lineer íncreasing
function of p.f. If a value q,l,-1 E[n,l-n] exists such that equalíty (3.4)
(11) above is satisfied, then this i s the unique solutíon. If not, then
the solution involves q,l,-1 ~(1-n) end the government prefers the high
infletíon outcome to the lov infletion outcome.
The inequelities ( 3.4) above reduce to the following
) 0' qT-1 ` n
(2rt-1)c2(pT(~-1 ' 0) - PT(x.l.-1 ` c)) - c2~2 ~ ~: n S qT-1 s 1-n
C 0: q z (1-n). (3.5)
It ís clenr fcom (j.5) that for the equalíty to be antisfied we must have
n 2 3~4. Thia is e necessnry, not sufficient, condition. No wet would ever
depert from intending infletion in T-1 íf thís condition were not
sacísfíed.
It ís ehown below thet for n given velue of pT-1, the equilíbrlum
value of qT-1 is decreasing in n for qT-1 ) 0, and that Cor gíven n, qT-1
at first rises with p,~,-1 end then falls. Thus the relationship is as
illustrated ín Figure ~. In Fígure 7b the curve shífts upwnrds as u is
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increased from 3~4 towarda 1. Below some critical value eT-1, and above a
hi~;her critical value pT-1, the wet government does not randomise but
plays the strategy of intending to cause inflation with probabili[y one.
At intermediate values of pT-1, randomisation occurs. The reason for this
result is that the difference in reputation p( - 0) andT MI'-1 pT(xI'-1 - c)
is wider at intermediete values of pT-1 than at extreme values. As
p1'-1 ~ 1 from below and as pT-1 ~ O, the difference pT(xT-1 - 0) -
pT(xT-1 - c) approaches zero. Beceuse infleting dces not injure one's
reputation so much if it is either very bsd or very good already, there is




Figure ~a: Relationship between Lhe optimum mixing ( ' ) and Che~I'-1





F'i~ure ~b: Relationship between the optimum mixing (qZ,-1) and the initiel
reputation (DT-1)
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If the wet qovernment ís rendomising in T-1, the equnlíty
1pT(xT-1 - O) - pTlx-~.-1 - c) ' Zlzrt-1)
must be sntisfícd, where pT(x,~,-1 ~ 0) and pT(xT-1 ~ c). are det~rminr~i hy
equations ( 3.1e) and (3.1b) above. The left-hnnd side of (3.6) is n
decrensing functíon of qT-1 for qT-1 E(0.1] and pT 1 E(0,1). A1.
qT-1 - 1, it equals zero, and it reaches a mnxímum at q,f-1 - 0. Define the
LHS of ( 3.6) ns F(pT-1'qT-1'rt), so we have
F(pT-1'qT-1'rt) ~ pT(xT-1 s G) - PTIx.i.-1 ~ c). (3.7)
F(.) is decreasing in q,f-1. F(O,q.f-l,n) s 0, F(l,q,f-l,n) - 0, and
F(pT-1'qT-1'rt) ~ 0 for 0 C p,~,-1 ( 1 and q,i,-1 C 1. Thus F( .) can be
illustreted as ín Figure 8 where each curve in ( pT-1,F) space is drawn for
a given value of qT-1, end auccessively higher curves correspond to lower
values of q,r-1. In the diagrem, randomisation occurs for values of pT-1 in
the interval (QT-1'pT-1)' qT-1 at first rises and then falls es pT-1 rlses
inside the intervel. Outside the interval, the wet government nlwnys plnys





Figure 8: Initíel reputation ( p.r-1) and the difference (F) betwecn
posterior reputetions in the event of zero inflatíon and in the
event of hlgh infletion
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"ftie reputation of the government in period T, p( - O) orT xl'-1
p,~,(x,C-1 - c), is an increasing function of PT-1' ~is is clearly true for
t'1'-1 S eT-1 ~d PT-1 2 pT-1' since for these values Lhe optimal q,l,-1 - 0
ruid ( 3.1a) and ( 3.1b) ímmediately indicete that this is so. For
e'f-1 ~ pT-1 ~ PT-1 this assertion may be proved as follows.
Define
Fo(P.f-1'91'-1'n) . p.f(xi'-1 z 0)
and
Fc(PT-1'QT'-1'n) ~ pT(xl'-1 L c)
from (3.1e) and (3.1b). Then
dpT(x,I'-1 -
0) ~Fo ~Fo dq,f-1
dpT-1 - ~pT-1 ` `~PT-1 dPT-1
and







dpT(x,I,-1 ' 0) dpT(x,I'-1 ' c) when ( 3.6) is satisfied, and the
dpT-1 - dpT-1
government i s randomising,
d`yf-1 ~Fo~dpT-1 - ~Fc~~pT-1
dPT-1 - - ~Fo~~9.1.-1 - ~Fc~~qT-1
Substituting (j.ll) into ( j.9) gives
dpT(Ki,-1 ` 0) ~Fo
dPT-1
dF~~dp.f-1 - ~Fc~clp,f-1
~PT-1 1 - Fq~Fq
(3.11)
(3.12)
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Since Fc ) O and Fo l O, the denominator (1-Fc~Fo) is grenter thnn ~n~,4 9 9 9
and clearly the whole RHS in (j.12) is positive. Applying the s~m~
dp
treatment to (j.10) confirms that dpT-1(x.~,-1 - c) is also posítive.
Thus en improvement in reputation at the stert of period T-1 results
in an improvement in the conditional reputations in period T.
To take the analysis beyond the penultímate period of the game T-1, ít
is neceasary to compute the value function for the government with
reputation p.i,-1 entering period T-1, V(T-l,p,l,-1). Whereas for period T,
the corresponding function V(T,pT) is e linear function of pT, ít does not
appear to be linear for T-1, and indeed it is not clear that the vnlue
function will be monotonically increasing in the reputation PT-1' ~e
reason is as follows:
Vl(T-1.P.f-1) ' sax M,r-1,
~i'-1
where M,1,-1 is defined in (3.3) above. Expectetions of inflation in T-1 are
given by (3.2) above for t~ T-1.
The optimal choice of q,l,-1 is non-monotonic in pT-1: there may be a
range over which q,l,-1 is felling in p,l,-1. Over this range xT-1 is rising
in pT-1. Consequently, as (3.3) indicates, the effect of the ímproved
reputation in period T may be offset by the effect of higher inflation
expectations in T-1. Thus it ia not cleac that the value functíon et T-1
is monotonic in reputation T-1, and it dces not seem straightforward to
extend this analysis beyond two periods.
4. Conclusions
This paper has attempted e number of generalisations of simple models of
mecrceconomic policy with incomplete informetion, with the purpose of
fínding out how sensitive their implications are to changes in
assumptions. The Desic result of the simple analysis (Backus and Dríffill
1985a; Barro 1986) is that the reputation effect can constraín a
government to mimic the behaviour of a government which is committed to a
zero-inflation strategy, so long as the government has e sufficir,ntly ]ong
time-horizon or a sufficiently long period of time remaíning in office.
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In Section 1 of the paper that simple analysis is extended, following
Vickers (1986) to allow for e weaker form of uncertainty ebout [he
government's preferences, namely the private sector is unsure about the
weiglit the government pleces on employment: it may be higher or lower, but
it is not zero. It then appears Chat if the two possible types are
relatively similar, they take ections at [he stact of the geme which
distinguish the true type oC government. The government which is less
concerned about employment and output initially signals its type in
instituting an inflation rete which is so low (though positive) that the
more concerned government would not want to imitate it. If, however, the
two possible types of government are relatively dissimilar, a pooling
eyuilibrium is possible in which both types initielly ínstitute a zero
inflation rate and the true type is only revealed in the last period of
the game.
Thus this result supports the Backus~DriCfill result. It appears that
it is not necessary for the public to believe that the govecnment may be
100 per cent committed to zero inflation for the reputational constraint
to induce zero inflation, only that the government oay care little enough
ebout outpu[.
The result may appear paradoxical in that separation occurs for
reletively similar government types and not for relatively dissimilar
types. The reason for this is that the less a government cares about
employment, the less 'budgeable' it is. That ia to say that it is less
willing to deviate from its preferred inflation rate in exchange for e
given reduction in the private sector's inflation expectation in the next
period. Nence it may be unwilling to set an inflation rate low enough to
prevent the more cacing government Cro~ ieitating ita action.
Zero inflation emerges in pooling equilibria even when bo[h possible
government types have an inflationary bías because, in a pooling
equilibrium, the actual and expected inflation rates in the first period
nce equal, for all types of goverrwent, and, when there are no
inflationary surprises, all typea of government prefer zero inflation to
any other. The private sector is eodelled for~ally as being indifCerent
among altecnative fully antícipated inflation rates. Consequently e
pooling outcome with zero inflation dominates other pooling equilibria.
Section 2 of the paper extends Che same analysis to ellow for any
possible type oC government within so~e range. In this case, the
scparating equilibrium epplies over a narrower renge of types of
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government, sínce for each type of government, the ndjncent type (with n
lower c-vnlue) chooses a low enough inflatíon rnte to sepnrnte it.rlf fr~m
the next higher type of government. Zero inflntion is plnyrA hy n
government with a relatively hlgh preference for employment nnd inflnHon.
No type of government uses a less-than-zero inflntíon rnte in ~quilihrium
to identify its [ype. If the range of possíble types is widcr thnn thF
pure separatíng equilibrium can accommodate, a hybrid poolinq~sepnrntinq
equílibríum may emerge with the most infletíonnry governments sepnrntrd,
but the least ínflationary governments pooled. Thus this ís an exnmplc
where, although there is an ínfinity of possible government types, nnd nn
infinity of ections, each type dces not take a different action in nrder
to identify itself uniquely. Only the most infletionary governments nrc
exposed.
In Section 3 the simple Backus~Driffill model is extended in e
completely different direction. Exogenous noise is introduced ínto the
model, so thet the eppearence of aome infletion is no lonqrr
incontrovertible evidence of en uncommitted or inflationary government. TC
mey simply be a random occurrence when the government has, with imperfect
controls, attempted to achieve zero inflatíon. Under these circumstnnces
the incentive for the uncommitted government to imitnte the one committr'd
to zero inflation is weakened considerably. In the penultimate stnge of
the gnme, en uncommitted government with either a very poor or a very good
reputation will intend to cause infletion, and a government with a
middling reputation will mix ínflating end not inflating, but no
uncommitted government wíll intend zero inflation with certainty.
The simple change to the model mede by adding uncerteinty about the
effects of policy complicates the enalysis considerably. Only a two-períod
game hes been enalysed in thia peper.
It appears from the tentative enalyais in this paper thnt the
reputational conatreints on macrceconomíc polícy remain effective when the
private sector'e beliefa ebout poasible government types are genernlísed,
but imperfect monitoring of governsent ections weekens those constraints
consíderably.
31 a ~. o~riiw
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Appendix
In thís Appendix we investigate whether, for the cases in Sectfon 1 of thc
paper where cl ~ cZ~2, the proposed pooling equílibria dominate th~
separating equilibrium, when both exist.











cl if x,f-1 s kB
if ) k
(A.1)
Thus the utilities over the whole game are
ul . ul(~c1.-1.~.-l.x~) - -kBl2 . cl(1-P)(kB-cz) - c1~2
u2 ~ ll2(x1'-1,x.1.-1,x7.)
~ -c2 ~ cZP(c2-kB)-
(A.2)
In the pure pooling equilibrium which obteins when cl ( c2~2 end
é s c2~2, we have in equilibriue
xi'-1(1) s x7'-1(2) s xI'-1 '
0






and tlie utilities are correspondingly
U1 ~ U1("'f-1'xT-1'x.I') ' -ci~2 ~ c1Íc1-c2)(I-P)
U2 ~ U2(xI'-1'xT-1'xT) ' -c2~2 ~ c2p(c2-cl).
(A.4)
It is clcar that Ui i Ui and U2 2 U2 and thus that the pooling equilibrium
dominates the separating equilibrium for both government types.
(For the case of the type-2 government, subtraction of (A.2) from
(A.4) yields an expression which gives on rearrangement
UZ - UZ - c2(c2~2-c1.kB) - c2í1-P)(k8-cl).
Ttie second term, c2(1-p)(k8-cl) is clearly negative. The first term is
positive because c2~2 - cl 2-kB when cl s c2~2, as reference to Figure 3
sliows. In Figure 3, U2 cuts the verticel axis at 45~, but the U2 curve is
sCrictly concave, thus c2~2 - cl 2-kB.)
If prívate sector expectational errors are examined, it is found Chat
the sum of expected squared errors over the two periods are smaller in the
pooling equilibrium. Thus all players in the game prefer the pooling
equilibrium to the separating equilibrium in this case.
Now turn to the case where cl ( c2~2 but c) c2~2 and there is a mixed
pooling solution. The equilibrium strategies are now
x7'-1(1) - 0
xT-1(2) -
I 0 with probability q




x.~. - c212 - Pcl ~ (1-P)c2 if ~-1 ` 0
(A.5)
cu~d c2 if ~.-1 ~ 0,
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wherc p - p ' (1-Fi)~l~
N~w the utilit.ies nre
UM - -clc2ll-P)(1-q) - cil2 ~ cl(cl-c2~2)
Uz - -cz U-P)(1-q).
321
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It can be shown that UZ - UZ 2 0 and UM - Ui 2 0. Subtrnctíng (A.2) fr~m
(A.6) for type 2 gíves
UZ - U2 ' c2(1-P)9 ~ c2PkB.
By (1.11) we deduce that
P c2~2
p ~ (1-PJ9 a c2 - cl
and hence
p~(1-PJ9 z 2p c2
- cl.
c2
Substituting for (1-p)q in (A.6) gives




As it was shorm ebove that ke x -c2~2 ~ cl, it is clear that Uz - UZ x 0.
Consider now UM - Ui. Subtracting (A.2) froa (A.6) gives
UM - Ui z -clc2(1-P)(1-q) ~ cllcl-c2~2)
~ kB~2 - cl(1-P)(kB-c2)
nnd wP, use (A.A) agnin to substitute out q yleldínq
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UM - Ui --cl((1-2p)cz~2pc1) ~ cl(cl-c2{2) ~ kd{2 - cl(1-p)(kB-cl)
- -cl(1-zP)(c2{z-cl) - c1kB(1-P) ' kB{2
2 -cl(czlz-cl) - c1kB ~ kB{z. (A.9)
From the definition ( 1.3) of kB we derive the condition
k~{z - c2kB - cz{2 ~ clcZ ~ 0
which, when subtracted from (A.9), yields
UM - Ui 2(cl-c2)(-kB~cl-c2{2) 2 ~.
since both bracketed terms, (cl-cZ) and (-IcB~cl-c2{2), are nega[ive.
Hence both types of government prefer the mixed poolíng equilibrium to
separeting when cl s c2{2 and c 2 c2{2. However, it dces not appear to be
the case that the private sector prefers Lhe mixed pooling equilibrium to
tlie separeting equilibrium. In the mixed-pooling outcome, the private
sector makes an error of cz(1-p)(1-q) with probability p~(1-p)q, end
cz(1-(1-p)(1-q)) with probability (1-p)(1-q) in the first period. And in
the second period, it makea no error if x,f-1 ~ c2 was observed ín the
first. But if x,f-1 r 0 was observed in the first period, then it mekes en
error of c2 - cZ{2 with probability (1-p) end (cl-c2{2) with probability p
in the second period.
The expected value of aquared expectational errors in the mixed-
Mpooling cese (~ -Up) gíves
-uP s 2P(c2-cl)(c2-2P(c2-cl)) ~ P(cz-cl)lczl2-cl)
which compares with the value in the separating equilibrium of
-UP - P(1-P)(kB-c2)2.
Thus this equilibrium may not dominate the separeting equilibrium,
elthough it is not dominated by ít, end so the aeparating equílibrium
cannot be ruled out on grounds of equilibrium dominance in the case
~1 s ~zlz, ~(~ clp~ll-P)~z) ~ cz{z.
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